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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Board of Review act in an arbitrary and capri-
cious fashion in failing to consider the employeefs continued 
negligence, repeated accumulated errors, and numerous acts of 
failure to properly perform his work as being disqualifying conduct 
sufficient to constitute willful or wanton conduct adverse to the 
employer's rightful interest under U.C.A. §35-4-5(b)(1)? [See 
Martin v. Dept. of Employment Sec, 682 P.2d 308 (Ut. 1984).] 
2. Did the Board of Review commit reversible error in 
failing to consider the continued inefficiency, repeated careless-
ness, lack of care and accumulated errors of the employee as 
sufficient to constitute "just cause"? [See Department of Employ-
ment Security Rules and Regulations, Section A71-07-1:5(A)(5).] 
3. Has the Department of Employment Security properly 
defined "just cause" in its determination of the nature of the acts 
of the respondent employee? 
4. Was the appellant denied due process when the Board of 
Review failed to provide it with a copy of repondent Dailami's 
brief, which failure appellant could only discover after reviewing a 
copy of the appeal record? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The employee-respondent, Abdul Dailami, was discharged as a 
boiler operator at Logan Hospital for just cause on January 30, 
1985. The employee was initially denied unemployment compensation 
benefits pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §35-4-5(b)(1), in a 
decision from the Department of Employment Security dated February 
20, 1985, for the reason he was terminated for just cause (Record 
pg. 0176). He appealed the initial decision of this Department on 
February 25, 1985. Subsequently, a hearing was held before an 
Administrative Law Judge on March 20, 1985, who reversed the 
decision of the Department, holding that the employee was not 
discharged for just cause and awarding the claimant unemployment 
compensation benefits (Record pp. 0120 - 0121). This decision was 
upheld by the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah 
in its decision dated May 10, 1985 (Record pp. 008 - 0010). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are well-established in the record consisting in 
part of the transcript of the hearing before the Administrative Law 
Judge (Record (hereinafter Rec.) pp. 0122 - 0140), the exhibits 
received on the date of the hearing before the ALJ, including the 
two written reprimands given Mr. Dailami prior to his termination 
(Rec. 0146 and 0157 - 0164), both of which were received by Mr. 
Dailami (Rec. 0087, 0089 and 0146), and the affidavits of Mr. 
Dailami's supervisor, Dennis Ostermiller, and two witnesses (Rec. 
0084 - 0090) . 
As noted by the ALJ in his opinion, the final episode after 
at least three other incidents and "two disciplinary counseling 
actions and a reprimand" (Rec. 0120) (there were actually two 
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reprimands - see Rec. 0146 and 0157 - 0164) which finally resulted 
in the employee's dismissal was the unscheduled repair of a leaking 
valve which involved the shutdown of the entire water system for 
Logan Hospital (Rec. 0120 and 0126). Because of the employee's 
failure to assure that the by-pass valve was properly monitored, the 
water supply for the hospital was interrupted (Rec. 0126). 
As evidenced by the testimony of the employee's supervisor, 
Mr. Dennis Ostermiller, at the hearing (Rec. 0125 - 0131) as well as 
two written reprimands for previous equipment shutdowns and other 
instances of failure to perform duties, dated September 2f 1983 
(Rec. 0146), and September 11, 1984 (Rec. 0157 - 0164), the cut-off 
of the hospital's water supply on January 14, 1985, was merely the 
culminating event in a history of similar incidents of negligence, 
poor work performance, failure of the employee to perform assigned 
duties, and violations of hospital policies (see Rec. 0125 - 0131). 
The repeated incidents are well-documented in the written 
reprimands as well as the oral references by Mr. Ostermiller. 
In addition to the January 14, 1985, incident, those situ-
ations involving the interruption of critical services to the 
hospital are as follows: 
1. On July 29, 1983, the employee shut off the two cooling 
towers (Rec. 0146, 0085). 
2. The employee-respondent, on September 1, 1983, again shut 
down the two cooling towers for the hospital (Rec. 0146, 0085). 
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3. In the winter of 1983, without prior notification, the 
employee turned off the boiler, resulting in total loss of steam for 
the building (Rec. 0146, 0085). 
4. On at least two instances on unspecified dates there was 
a total loss of hot water at the hospital due to employee's inabil-
ity to repair water heaters (Rec. 0085, 0161). 
5. During a repair in 1983, the employee failed to put the 
medical air compressor on by-pass with the result that there was a 
loss of respiratory air in the hospital. This could have resulted 
in the death of a patient had anyone been on a respirator at the 
time (Rec. 0085, 0161 - 0162). 
In addition, the employee failed to perform or complete the 
following maintenance or repairs as instructed: 
1. Mr. Dailami failed to replace the steam trap in the 
pharmacy and failed to replace a steam valve in the engineering 
shop (Rec. 0086, 0157 - 0158). 
2. Despite repeated requests, Mr. Dailami failed to repair 
the number one chilled water circulating pump (Rec. 0086, 0158). 
3. The employee failed to replace or repair pop-off valves 
(Rec. 0086, 0158). 
4. The employee took almost two years (August 1982 - July 
1984) to repair the number one water heater for the hospital (Rec. 
0086, 0158). 
5. It took the employee from the spring of 1984 to June of 
1984 to repair a boiler problem (Rec. 0158). 
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6. After the employee's departure, it was discovered that he 
had failed to properly maintain anti-corrosive chemical levels in 
the hospital boiler and steam system, resulting in excessive corro-
sion. He was admonished about this while still at the hospital 
(Rec. 0086, 0160). 
Finally, Mr. Dailami showed an inability to diagnose or 
repair equipment in the following instances: 
1. Failure through June 1984 to diagnose a de-aerator 
temperature control problem (Rec. 0087, 0159). 
2. Failure to diagnose a proof of closure switch problem on 
boilers in 1983 as well as 1984 (Rec. 0159, 0160). 
3. Failure to diagnose heat control problems on number one 
and number two water heaters in 1983 and 1984 (Rec. 0158, 0159). 
4. Failure to diagnose a medical air compressor unloader 
valve malfunction (Rec. 0087, 0160). 
5. Failure in early 1984 to diagnose a pneumatic air 
compressor bearing problem (Rec. 0087, 0160). 
6. Failure to properly repair number 2 heat pump (Rec. 
0160) . 
7. Failure in the summer of 1983 to repair an autoclave as 
requested (Rec. 0187). 
Evidence of all the above-stated facts were presented to the 
ALJ in either oral testimony or in written exhibits and were 
available to the Board of Review. Nevertheless, the ALJ as well as 
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the Board of Review ignored reference to these accumulated, repeated 
and numerous failings and errors of the employee-respondent, char-
acterizing them as "isolated incidents" (Rec. 0009, 0121). 
Finally, in an act discovered only after this appeal was 
filed and the record examined, it was learned that although a copy 
of appellant's brief was sent by the Department of Employment 
Security to the employee-respondent (Rec. 0082), the Department did 
not provide the appellant, Logan Hospital, with a copy of the 
materials which were the equivalent of respondent's brief that Mr. 
Dailami filed with the Department of Employment Security (Rec. 0016 
- 0081) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Judging from the decision of the Board of Review and the ALJ, 
it appears that their interpretation of "just cause" is that unless 
an employee performs a "willful or wanton act," the employer must 
accept sloppy, negligent, substandard performance and continue to 
employ error-prone persons, and discharge will require the employer 
to pay unemployment compensation benefits. The appellant maintains 
"just cause" for discharging an employee can and should be the 
employee's inability to meet the standards and procedures of the 
employer which are known to the employee. Furthermore, the appel-
lant maintains that violations, mistakes, and accidents can accumu-
late, as they did in the case of Mr. Dailami, until the totality of 
the repeated nature of the conduct constitutes either willful or 
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wanton conduct as specified in Martin v. Dept. of Employment Sec, 
682 P.2d 308 (Ut. 1984), or "just cause" for discharge, rendering 
the employee ineligible for unemployment compensation. The proposed 
Rules and Regulations of the Industrial Commission, §A71-07-l: 
5(A)(5), specifically provide that "continued inefficiency, repeated 
carelessness, or lack of care exercised by ordinary, reasonable 
workers in similar circumstances," may be disqualifying as far as 
unemployment compensation is concerned. Notwithstanding this 
language, this aspect of "just cause" was totally ignored by the 
Board of Review. 
The Administrative Law Judge in hearing the respondent's case 
admitted that there had been prior occasions involving equipment 
shutdowns (Rec. 0120). In the findings of fact the ALJ also 
determined there had been prior reprimands, although there was no 
reference to other conduct adverse to the interest of employer, but 
reference only to the prior equipment shutdowns (Rec. 0120). Not-
withstanding these factors and the fact that the Utah State 
Legislature in 1983 amended the Utah Code in Utah Code Annotated 
§35-4-5(b)(1) to add another reason separate and apart from 
"deliberate, willful or wanton conduct adverse to the employer's 
rightful interest," to-wit "just cause", the ALJ ignored the 
continued and repeated nature of the employee's conduct as suffi-
cient to constitute either "willful or wanton conduct" or "just 
cause" and denied and reversed the Department's initial decision 
that the employee had been fired for just cause. 
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The Board of Review also failed or refused to consider the 
continued, repeated and accumulated nature of respondent's errors, 
referring to them as "isolated instances" (Rec. 0009), not con-
sidering the fact that in Martin v. Dept. of Employment Sec, supra, 
this Court admitted that "repeated acts of negligence" could rise to 
the level of "deliberate, willful or wanton" conduct or that 
continued inefficiency, repeated carelessness or lack of due care is 
sufficient to constitute "just cause" under U.C.A. §35-4-5(b)(1) and 
the Rules and Regulations of the Department of Employment Security, 
Section A71-07-1:5(A)(5). 
The Board of Review in its decision ignored the 18 incidents 
of negligence, inefficiency or the employee's failure to perform his 
duties referred to in the record and mentioned only four instances 
of the respondent's failure to perform his responsibilities. These 
numerous incidents were characterized as "isolated instances," and 
it was claimed that most of these incidents occurred in 1983. The 
Board of Review apparently felt that the standard should be that the 
employer is under a legal obligation to blot from its memory earlier 
infractions and reprimands for which there was not immediate 
termination. This position clearly runs contrary to the stance 
taken by at least one other "just cause" jurisdiction. 
The appellant maintains that the Board of Review clearly 
misapplied existing standards justifying termination and the 
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withholding of unemployment benefits for the reason of willfull or 
wanton conduct. In light of this misapplication, the result reached 
was arbitrary and capricious, immasculating defined terms and 
legislative intent. 
In addition, "just cause" has not been properly defined or 
applied by the Department of Employment Security. This term was 
improperly defined in the instant case in terms of the deliberate, 
willful and wanton conduct. 
Finally, the appellant to its prejudice was denied due 
process when the Department of Employment Security supplied the 
respondent-employee with a copy of the appellant's brief on appeal 
to the Board of Review while at the same time failing to provide 
appellant with a copy of respondent's brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO 
CONSIDER THE REPEATED, RECURRING AND NUMEROUS ACTS OF THE EMPLOYEE 
WHICH WERE SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE WILLFUL AND WANTON CONDUCT 
ADVERSE TO THE EMPLOYER'S RIGHTFUL INTEREST UNDER THE LANGUAGE OF 
THIS COURT IN MARTIN V. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 
682 P.2d 308 (1984) . 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Martin v. Department 
of Employment Security, 682 P.2d 304, 305 (Ut. 1984), stated as 
follows with regard to repeated acts sufficient to disqualify an 
employee from receiving unemployment compensation benefits: 
We concede that repeated negligence or care-
lessness by an employee who is totally indif-
ferent or hostile to his employer's interests 
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might rise to the level of "deliberate, will-
ful or wanton" conduct. (emphasis added) 
In the Martin case, this Court cited two decisions which 
stand for the above-cited proposition. The first was Rieder v. 
Commonwealth Employment Compensation Board of Review, 15 Pa. Commw. 
211, 325 A.2d 347 (1974). In that decision the claimant worked for 
two years inspecting trousers for defects. On a number of occasions 
the employee passed trousers with obvious defects. The Pennsylvania 
court sustained that state's Department of Employment Security and 
its Board of Review in its conclusion that the claimant was guilty 
of "willful misconduct". The conclusion was based on the fact that 
the claimant could not explain her continued oversights, and her 
supervisor testified that she did not believe that the employee 
cared. 
The second case cited by this Court was Collison v. Common-
wealth Employment Compensation Board of Review, 66 Pa. Commw. 416, 
444 A.2d 1330 (1982). In that case, despite repeated warnings, the 
claimant did not try to improve his working behavior. The Penn-
sylvania court upheld the Review Board's conclusion that the 
claimant's conduct evidenced a conscious indifference to his 
employer's interests and his employment duties, and that this was 
enough to support a finding of "willful misconduct". 
In addition to these cases, the appellant has discovered 
other authorities which support this general proposition. 76 Am Jur 
-10-
2d, Unemployment Compensation §54, page 948 states in pertinent part 
as follows: 
Work-connected negligence or inefficiency 
constitutes misconduct within the meaning of 
an unemployment compensation statute preclud-
ing a discharged employee from unemployment 
compensation benefits when the negligence or 
inefficiency is of such a degree or recur-
rence as to manifest culpability, wrongful 
intent, evil design, or intentional or sub-
stantial disregard for that employer's inter-
ests or of an employee's duties and obliga-
tions. (emphasis added) 
See also Drake v. Unemploy. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 470 A.2d 1115 
(Pa, Cmwlth. 1984), where willful misconduct was found when a cab 
driver employee was involved in five accidents in two years. In 
Appeal of Miller, 453 A.2d 1269 (N.H. 1982), three reprimands were 
given to the claimant for safety violations. On the fourth inci-
dent, which consisted of jumping off a loading dock when he was told 
not to, he was discharged. The denial of benefits was upheld due to 
"recurring carelessness or negligent acts sufficient to constitute 
misconduct" . 
As previously noted, the employee's misconduct is well-docu-
mented in the record. It was repetitive, recurring over a period of 
approximately two years. Mr. Dailami received two written repri-
mands, one in 1983 and one in September of 1984, with no improve-
ments noted (Rec. 0146, 0157 - 0164). Yet, in spite of this obvious 
fact, the Administrative Law Judge and the Board of Review, in words 
that cause one to wonder if the record was read, described Mr. 
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Dailami's repeated acts of unacceptable conduct as ordinary negli-
gence in "isolated instances" (Rec. 0009 - 0121). 
Appellant maintains that the position of this Court regarding 
repeated acts of negligence as being sufficient to constitute 
"deliberate, willful and wanton conduct" should apply here, although 
many of respondent's acts go beyond mere negligence. If the conduct 
of this employee in this case is not sufficiently repetitive or 
recurring to constitute willful and wanton conduct under the 
criteria set out in Martin v. Department of Employment Security, 
supra, then one is caused to wonder if such a case exists. Even if 
the appellant were to concede that all of the respondent's failures 
to properly perform were due to negligence, they can hardly be 
termed "isolated." While the incidents did occur one-at-a-time and 
in this sense they were isolated, the incidents occurred again and 
again and were so numerous as to cause any person of ordinary 
intelligence to have reason to believe that if after two years there 
was no improvement, that it was unlikely there would be any improve-
ment in the future. The fact that each incident happened one after 
the other and that there may have been a time gap between the 
happenings should not mean that the incidents were not repeated. 
Surely, the appellant was not required to blot from its memory each 
incident after it occurred. To do so would mean that nothing would 
ever rise to the repetitive standard required to constitute willful 
or wanton conduct. Furthermore, that appellant had not forgotten is 
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verified by the reprimands given to repondent referring to prior 
acts • 
Appellant will not replicate here the litany of equipment 
failures, failure to repair equipment and other incidents of 
improper work performance and job rule violations by the employee-
respondent, but refers the Court to its summary contained in its 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. Both the ALJ and the Board of Review apparently 
ignored these numerous incidents, which were presented at the time 
of the hearing, by summarily dismissing them almost without comment, 
referring only to the equipment shutdowns. 
The appellant maintains that in failing to apply the Martin 
standard which in dicta stated that repeated acts of negligence or 
carelessness can constitute deliberate, willful and wanton conduct, 
the Board of Review entered findings not supported by substantial 
evidence amounting to reversible arbitrary and capricious action. 
See Salt Lake City Corporation v. Department of Employment Security, 
657 P.2d 1312 (Ut. 1982) . 
POINT II 
THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND 
AMOUNTED TO AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THAT THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY 
SHOWED THAT THE EMPLOYEE WAS TERMINATED FOR JUST CAUSE ONLY AFTER 
REPEATED WARNINGS FOR NUMEROUS ERRORS AND INCIDENTS OF FAILURE TO 
PROPERLY PERFORM HIS WORK. 
Assuming, for purposes of argument only, that the proposed 
regulations defining "just cause", Section A71-07-1:5(II)-l of the 
Rules and Regulations on Discharge, are correct, the employer 
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clearly met its burden of showing the required elements of culpa-
bility, knowledge and control, and there is not substantial evidence 
to support the findings of the Board of Review, rendering its 
decision reversible for the reason it is arbitrary and capricious. 
An analysis of the elements of "just cause" as defined in the 
proposed rules and regulations shows that the claimant's conduct 
falls within each one of these elements: 
A. Culpability. (§A71-07-l:5(A)(3)(a)) 
Culpability is defined in part as: 
. . The wrongness of the conduct must be 
considered in the context of the particular 
employment and how it effects the employer's 
rights. If the conduct was an isolated 
incident of poor judgment and there is no 
expectation that the conduct will be con-
tinued or repeated, potential harm may not be 
shown and therefore it is not necessary to 
discharge the employee. (emphasis added) 
In the instant case, the conduct of the employee was not isolated, 
but repetitive and persistent. Indeed, some 18 separate and 
distinct instances of conduct adverse to the interests of the 
employer are noted in the record. (See STATEMENT OF FACTS.) In 
addition, some of these incidents potentially involved life-
threatening situations to patients at the hospital. The claimant 
was warned about shutdowns, maintenance failures, and failure to 
perform duties, yet his performance continued to be deficient in 
these areas, despite reprimands. Significantly, both the Board of 
Review and the ALJ characterized respondent's conduct as "isolated 
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instances," rather than an isolated instance (Rec. 0009, 0121). 
(See Addendum Exhibits H & I.) "Isolated instances" when added 
together comprise repeated instances. Furthermore, the precise 
reason reprimands were given was because there was reason to believe 
based on experience that they would occur again, which, in fact, 
proved to be the case. 
The Board of Review further obfuscated the issue of culpa-
bility by referring to the culpability standard in Clearfield City 
v. Board of Review, 663 P.2d 440 (Ut. 1983) (Rec. 0009), which was a 
"willful and wanton" case, not a "just cause" termination case. 
Culpability, as the rules and regulations require of employees for a 
just cause termination disqualifying him for unemployment compen-
sation, was clearly shown in the evidence because of the repetitive 
nature of Mr. Dailami's misconduct. 
B. Knowledge. (§A71-07-1:5(A)(3)(b)) 
Knowledge is defined in pertinent part as follows: 
. . [H]e (the employee) should reasonably 
have been able to anticipate the effect his 
conduct would have. Knowledge may not be 
established unless the employer gave a clear 
explanation of the expected behavior or had a 
written policy, except in the case of fla-
grant violation of a universal standard of 
behavior. . . . A specific warning is one 
way of showing that the employee had knowl-
edge of the expected conduct. After the 
employee is given a warning, he should be 
given an opportunity to correct objectionable 
conduct. Additional violations occurring 
after the warning would be necessary to 
establish just cause for a discharge. 
In both September of 1983 and September of 1984, the plain-
tiff was given warnings regarding unscheduled shutdown of equipment 
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and failure to perform maintenance. Despite these warnings, the 
conduct for which he was reprimanded continued, resulting in his 
termination. Surely, in light of the written reprimands, it cannot 
be said that Mr. Dailami did not have knowledge of his deficiencies. 
He signed the 1983 reprimand (Rec. 0146), and there are affidavits 
of both persons who were present on the occasion of his second 
reprimand in late 1984, who under oath both say that he received the 
second reprimand (Rec. 0087 and 0089). 
C. Control. (SA71-07-1:5(A)(3)(c)) 
With regard to control, the Rules and Regulations state: 
The conduct must have been within the 
power and capacity of the claimant to control 
or prevent. 
Significantly, the Board of Review conceded that "the incidents in 
1983 may have been within claimant's control" (Rec. 0009). Clearly, 
the reprimands indicate the situation was within the employee's 
power to control and prevent. 
For reasons not entirely clear, the Rules and Regulations in 
defining "just cause", Section A71-07-1:5(A)(4), state: 
The term "just cause" as used in Section 
5(b)(1) does not lessen the requirement that 
there be some fault on the part of the 
employee involved. Prior to the 1983 addi-
tion of the term "just cause" the commission 
interpreted Section 5(b)(1) to require an 
intentional infliction of harm or intentional 
disregard of the employer's interests. 
The intent of the Legislature in adding the 
words "just cause" to Section 5(b)(1) was 
apparently to correct this restrictive inter-
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pretation. While some fault must be present, 
it is sufficient that the acts were intended, 
the consequences were reasonably foreseeable, 
and that the acts have serious effect on the 
employee's job or the employer's interests. 
(emphasis added) 
The aforementioned Rules and Regulations propose that mere 
"mistakes, inefficiency, failures of performance as the result of 
inability or incapacity, inadvertence in isolated instances, good 
faith errors in judgment or in the exercise of discretion, minor but 
casual or unintentional carelessness or negligence" are not suffi-
cient to establish knowledge or control. See §A71-07-l:5(A)(5)• 
However, this same section, §A71-07-l:5(A)(5), seems to contradict 
itself when it states as follows: 
However, continued inefficiency, repeated 
carelessness, or lack of care, exercised by 
ordinary reasonable workers in similar cir-
cumstances, may be disqualifying depending on 
the reason and degree of the carelessness, 
the knowledge and control of the employee. 
(emphasis added) 
The employee in this case was guilty of repeated instances of 
carelessness and failure to perform as set out in detail in the 
record. He certainly had knowledge because of the reprimands he 
received. The absence of control seems to be characteristic of 
negligence or carelessness and the requirement that the repeated 
negligence or carelessness be within the control of the employee 
seems contradictory. Furthermore, in setting a lower standard for 
"just cause" and abolishing the intentional aspect of it in Section 
A71-07-1:5(A)(4), imposing a control requirement seems to be 
contradictory. Neverthelessf the detailed reprimands and the very 
nature of the work clearly demonstrate that the conduct was within 
the employee's ability to prevent, thereby justifying the denial of 
unemployment security benefits under U.C.A. §35-4-5(b)(1) for a just 
cause termination. Therefore, although under normal circumstances 
in the event of an isolated occurrence fault would not be found, in 
this case the conduct of the employee due to its repetitive nature 
constituted "just cause" for termination. 
The employee by his failure to follow instructions was guilty 
of a "serious behavior problem" as set out in the Constructive 
Discipline section of the hospital Employee Relations Policy (Rec. 
0153). Furthermore, item (5) on page 7 of the hospital Constructive 
Discipline Policy (Rec. 0153) states as follows: 
(5) inefficiency, incompetence, or negli-
gence in the performance of duties (incompe-
tence related to "patient care" is considered 
very serious!) . 
In addition, under the hospital Constructive Discipline Policy, page 
8, item (6) (Rec. 0154), we read: 
Examples of serious behavior problems or rule 
violations can include but are not limited to 
. . . 
(6) refusal to carry out work instruc-
tions. . . . 
By failing to complete the following duties the claimant was 
remiss in executing his job as described in his "position descrip-
tion" : 
(1) failure to repair steam trap in pharmacy, 
(2) failure to replace steam valve in engin-
eering shop, (3) failure to investigate im-
properly maintained pop-off valves on steam 
system, (4) failure to repair number 1 water 
circulating pump as requested, (5) failure to 
properly monitor chemical mixture of water in 
boiler and steam system. 
(See employee's job description consisting of three pages and 
attached in the Addendum as Exhibit A. This job description was 
submitted at the time of the hearing and appears in the Record at 
pages 0141 - 0143.) 
Finally, the State of Ohio has a statute which like Utah's 
disqualifies employees from receiving unemployment benefits for just 
cause. (See Ohio Revised Code Annotated §4141.29(D)(2)(a) in 
Addendum Exhibit B.) Courts in Ohio considered some situations very 
similar to the instant case and held that the employee was termin-
ated for "just cause" and thereby disqualified from receiving 
unemployment compensation. 
Probably the case which is most closely on point is Winters 
National Bank & Trust Co. v. Board of Review, et al., 9 CCH Unem-
ployment Insurance Reporter, para. 9464, Ohio Court of Common Pleas, 
Montgomery County, No. 81-3363, 12/29/82. (See Addendum Exhibit C.) 
In this case it was held that violations, mistakes and poor work 
attitude can accumulate until the totality constitutes "just cause" 
justifying discharge and disqualifying the employee for unemployment 
compensation benefits. Significant is the following language which 
appears in that one page decision: 
It is certain from the transcript that Donna 
K. Woods knew the rules of the bank and was 
warned of consequences of future infraction. 
There were future infractions. Further, 
there is no legal requirement that an 
employer somehow block from his memory the 
infractions for which there was not an 
immediate termination. From the Referee's 
decision, it appears that he is of the 
opinion that unless an employee performs a 
willful or a wrongful act, the employer must 
accept sloppy work and continue employing the 
error-prone person. But just cause for 
discharging an employee can be and should be 
the employee's inability to meet the stan-
dards and procedures of the employer which 
are made known to the employee. Violations, 
mistakes and poor work attitude can accumu-
late until the totality constitutes "just 
cause for discharge." (emphasis added) 
A similar result was reached in the case of Nurse v. Board of 
Review and Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., Inc., 9 CCH Unemployment 
Insurance Reporter, para. 9346, Ohio Court of Appeals, Summit 
County. No. 9836, 2/18/81, (see Addendum Exhibit D) where for an 
accumulation of errors an employee was fired for just cause, even 
though she did not receive notice that future infractions would 
subject her entire work record for review in consideration of 
termination. Similarly, in the case of Willie L. Steigle v. Board 
of Review and Earl M. Jorgensen Co., Allen United Steel Division, et 
al., 9 CCH Unemployment Insurance Reporter, para. 9449, Ohio Court 
of Common Pleas, Ohio County, No. A-8009521, 2/9/82, an employee's 
discharge for just cause was upheld for carelessness and negligent 
work involving numerous errors by the employee. (See Addendum 
Exhibit E.) 
In Martin v. Bd. of Reviewf supra, this Court said under 
certain circumstances it would be willing to deem repeated acts of 
negligence sufficient to constitute willful and wanton conduct. A 
similar, but lower, standard should apply to "just cause", and the 
accumulation of errors and poor quality of work should be disqual-
ifying. The conduct as evidenced in the instant case should 
constitute termination for just cause requiring the denial of 
unemployment compensation benefits. 
It seems logical to apply the standard from Ohio where 
conduct does not need to arise to the stature of misconduct and 
where repeated acts of carelessness or negligence not amounting to 
willful or wanton conduct are sufficient to constitute just cause. 
POINT III 
THE PROPOSED REGULATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 
A71-07-l:5(II)-l-DISCHARGE, MISDEFINES "JUST CAUSE." 
U.C.A. §35-4-5(b)(1) states as follows with regard to 
employees1 ineligibility for unemployment compensation: 
An individual is ineligible for benefits or 
for purposes of establishing a waiting 
period: 
* * * 
(b)(1) For the week in which the claimant 
was discharged for just cause or for an act 
or omission in connection with employment, 
not constituting a crime, which is deliber-
ate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the 
employer's rightful interest, if so found by 
the commission, and thereafter until the 
claimant has earned an amount equal to at 
least six times the claimant's weekly benefit 
amount in bona fide covered employment, 
(emphasis added) 
The proposed rules and regulations defining "just cause" 
promulgated by the Department of Employment Security contained in 
Rule A71-07-1:5(A)(3) state in part as follows: 
The basic factors which establish fault and 
are essential for a determination of ineli-
gibility under the definition of just cause 
are: 
a. Culpability. This is the seriousness 
of the conduct as it affects continuance of 
the employment relationship. The discharge 
must have been necessary to avoid actual or 
potential harm to the employer's rightful 
interests. A discharge would not be con-
sidered "necessary" if it is not consistent 
with reasonable employment practices. The 
wrongness of the conduct must be considered 
in the context of the particular employment 
and how it effects the employer's rights. If 
the conduct was an isolated incident of poor 
judgment and there is no expectation that the 
conduct will be continued or repeated, poten-
tial harm may not be shown and therefore it 
is not necessary to discharge the employee. 
b. Knowledge. The employee must have had 
a knowledge of the conduct which the employer 
expected. It is not necessary that the 
claimant intended to cause harm to the 
employer, but he should reasonably have been 
able to anticipate the effect his conduct 
would have. Knowledge may not be established 
unless the employer gave a clear explanation 
of the expected behavior or had a written 
policy, except in the case of flagrant vio-
lations of a universal standard of behavior. 
If the employer's expectations are unclear, 
ambiguous or inconsistent, the existence of 
knowledge is not shown. A specific warning 
is one way of showing that the employee had 
knowledge of the expected conduct. After the 
employee is given a warning, he should be 
given an opportunity to correct objectionable 
conduct. Additional violations occurring 
after the warning would be necessary to 
establish just cause for a discharge. 
c. Control. The conduct must have been 
within the power and capacity of the claimant 
to control or prevent. 
This language was approved by this Court in Kehl v. Board 
of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, Decision No. 20193, 
filed May 23, 1985. 
Appellant maintains the standard set out in the proposed rule 
is so rigid that it seems doubtful that anything less than "the 
deliberate, willful or wanton" standard also contained in U.C.A. 
§35-4-5 (b) (1) will suffice to meet it. Indeed, it is hard to 
imagine how the standards of culpability, knowledge and control can 
be met without also meeting the willful and wanton standard. Three 
other jurisdictions, as noted in the Kehl decision, Ohio, Indiana 
and Delaware, have also adopted "just cause" as disqualifying an 
employee for unemployment security benefits. [See Addendum Exhibit 
B, Ohio Revised Code Annotated §4141.29(D)(2)(a); Exhibit F, West's 
Annotated Indiana Code §22-4-15-1; and Exhibit G, Delaware Code 19 
§3315(2).] Furthermore, Indiana and Ohio courts have both held that 
repeated negligence is sufficient to constitute fault. 
In the Indiana case of Wakshlag v. Review Board of Indiana 
Employment Security, 413 N.E. 2d 1078, 1082 (Ind. App. 1980), we 
read: 
"Fault" or " jus t cause" as used in the 
Employment S e c u r i t y Act, means f a i l u r e or 
v i o l a t i o n , and does not mean something blame-
worthy, cu lpable , or worthy of censure . . . . 
Determination of j u s t cause i s a question of 
f a c t . ( c i t a t i o n omi t t ed) I t i s conduct 
evincing such willful or wanton disregard of 
employer's interest as is found in deliberate 
violations or disregard of standards of 
behavior which the employer has the right to 
expect of his employee, or a carelessness or 
negligence of such a degree or recurrence as 
to manifest equal culpability, wrongful 
intent, evil design, or to show an intention-
al or substantial disregard of employer's 
interests, or of employee's duties or obliga-
tions to his employer, (emphasis added) 
Here, an Indiana appeals court said that "just cause," which it 
equates with fault, does not mean culpable conduct, yet the Utah 
Department of Employment Security has made culpability an element. 
See Rules and Regulations Section A71-07-1:5( A) (3 ) ( a) . It is also 
significant, as previously noted, that one definition of just cause 
in Indiana is framed in terms of willful or wanton conduct or 
carelessness or negligence of a recurring nature. This sounds more 
like the repeated negligence standard of Martin v. Dept. of Employ-
ment Security, supra, than just cause. 
In the case of Delaware, that state's Supreme Court defined 
just cause in terms of a willful or wanton conduct. As stated in 
Starkey v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, 340 A.2d 165, 166 
(Del. Supr. Ct. 1975), this language was cited with approval in the 
Delaware Supreme Court case of Employee Insurance Appeal Board v. 
Martin, 413 A.2d 1265, 1267 (1981): 
Generally, the term "just cause" refers to a 
willful or wanton act in violation of either 
the employers' interest, or of the employee's 
duties, or of the employee's expected stan-
dard of conduct. (citations omitted) It is 
essentially the equivalent of the term "mis-
conduct" found in the Unemployment Compensa-
tion Statutes, and interpreted in the case 
law of the jursidictions. 
Accordingly, Delaware definitions should not be looked to since 
"just cause" in that jurisdiction appears to be equated with willful 
and wanton conduct. Caution needs to be exercised in our own 
jurisdiction that just cause is not confused with the higher 
standard of willful and wanton acts and that in Utah "just cause" 
does not become equated with willful and wanton conduct, 
Ohio courts have established a standard for just cause which, 
while it requires fault, does not confuse willful and wanton conduct 
or misconduct with the less eggregious "just cause". As stated in 
Sellers v. Board of Review, Ohio Bureau of Employment, 440 N.E.2d 
550, 552 (Ohio App. 1981): 
. . .There is, of course, not a slide rule 
definition of just cause. Essentially, each 
case must be considered upon its particular 
merits. Traditionally, just cause, in the 
statutory sense, is that which, to an ordi-
nary intelligent person is a justifiable 
reason for doing or not doing a particular 
a c t . . . 
This court had occasion to construe the 
words "just cause" in relation to a resigna-
tion in Payton v. Sun TV (citation omitted). 
We said there that just cause had no slide 
rule definition; rather each case must be 
considered upon its particular merits. 
Traditionally, just cause in the statutory 
sense is that which, to an ordinary intel-
ligent person is a justifiable reason for 
doing or not doing a particular thing. . . . 
As also stated in the case of Angelkovski v. Buckeye Potato 
Chip Company, Inc., 463 N.E. 2d 1280, 1284 (Ohio App. 1983), in 
construing just cause: 
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We have previously held that "just cause" is 
that kind of conduct which an ordinarily 
intelligent person would regard as a justi-
fiable reason for discharging an employee, 
(citations omitted) The conduct need not 
rise to the stature of misconduct/ but there 
must be some fault on the part of the employ-
ee. 
As previously noted in ARGUMENT/ POINT IIf a number of Ohio cases 
have held that an accumulation of errors or continued poor quality 
work is enough to constitute discharge for just cause. This would 
seem to say that a standard similar to that of Martin v. Dept. of 
Employment Security/ 682 P.2d 308 (Ut. 1984), for repeated acts of 
negligence/ but something less than willful or wanton conduct/ 
should be sufficient to constitute just cause. 
Summary 
Delaware seems to equate just cause with willful and wanton 
conduct. Both Indiana and Ohio courts have held that accumulated 
errors or repeated negligent acts or carelessness are sufficient to 
constitute just cause and render an employee ineligible for 
unemployment security benefits. In addition, both Indiana and Ohio 
seem to reject knowledge and control as elements of just cause, 
although Indiana equates just cause with willful and wanton conduct. 
Ohio has adopted an "ordinary intelligent person" standard as 
just cause for termination. The appellant urges that this standard 
also be adopted in this state as grounds for termination for just 
cause. 
The appellant submits that the proposed rules and regulations 
defining "just cause" are in error and that by applying such 
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stringent definitions, in the instant case, the Board of Review 
committed reversible error in affirming the reversal of the denial 
of unemployment compensation by the Department of Employment 
Security. 
POINT IV 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW DENIED THE APPELLANT DUE PROCESS WHEN IT FAILED 
TO MAIL APPELLANT A COPY OF MR. DAILAMI'S BRIEF WHICH APPELLANT 
DISCOVERED ONLY WHEN IT REVIEWED THE RECORD ON APPEAL. 
The Utah Department of Employment Security has no rules and 
regulations regarding the procedural aspects of filing briefs or 
written memoranda in matters appealed to the Board of Review. 
However, in the Record at page 0114, correspondence from this 
Department reveals that once the transcript of the hearing was 
supplied, employer was allowed ten days from the date of the letter 
to submit a written memorandum. As indicated in the Record, page 
0082, the respondent Mr. Dailami was provided with a copy of the 
employer's brief and given ten days from the date of the letter to 
submit a written response memorandum. However, when Mr. Dailami did 
submit a rather lengthy letter and attachments within the ten days 
allowed by the Department of Employment Security (Rec. 0016 - 0081), 
this response brief was not forwarded to appellant's counsel as 
appellant's brief had been forwarded to the respondent, Mr. Dailami. 
This failure was discovered only after appeal was made to the 
Supreme Court and after the appellant obtained a copy of the record 
on appeal. Appellant maintains that this was clearly a denial of 
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procedural due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution as well as Article I, Section 7 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah which deprived the respondent of 
the right of filing a reply brief. 
Because the Department of Employment Security has no rules 
and regulations regarding procedure on appeal to the Board of 
Review, the Department of Employment Security can hardly be faulted 
for failure to apply its own rules and regulations. However, the 
appellant maintains that fundamental rights of due process have been 
denied. 
This Court in Nielsen v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Ut. 
1983), stated as follows with regard to procedural due process 
mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Utah's Constitution, Article I, Section 7: 
"Due process" is not a technical concept 
that can be reduced to a formula with a fixed 
content unrelated to time, place, and cir-
cumstances. Rather, "the demands of due 
process rest on the concept of basic fairness 
of procedure and demand a procedure appro-
priate to the case and just to the parties 
involved." Rupp v. Grantsville City, Utah, 
610 P.2d 338, 341 (1980) . 
The appellant maintains that it was not accorded procedural 
due process when the employee was provided with a copy of the 
employer's brief, but the employer was not provided with a copy of 
the employee's brief, thereby depriving the appellant of making any 
sort of comment or filing a reply brief at the administrative level. 
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Although the appellant realizes that in administrative 
procedure, the niceties of the technical rules of law are not as 
strictly supplied, nevertheless, fundamental fairness within the 
concept of procedural due process should be observed. Indeed, this 
Court's own rules provide for service of briefs on the opposing 
parties. (See Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.) 
While the employee can certainly be excused from understanding this, 
it does not seem that the Utah Department of Employment Security 
should escape such criticism; especially, when that body took upon 
itself to provide the employee a copy of appellant's brief to the 
Board of Review when the appellant had already certified that he had 
sent a copy of his brief to the employee, and then denied appellant 
similar treatment. 
As previously noted, the Rules and Regulations of the Depart-
ment of Employment Security are silent on the issue of serving the 
opposing party with a copy of that party's brief. Nevertheless, 
appellant maintains that procedural due process dictates that 
opposing parties be served with copies of briefs. 5 CJS Appeal and 
Error, §1336(b), states as follows with regard to the failure of a 
party to serve the opposing party with a copy of his brief: 
The effect of a failure to serve a brief on 
the adverse party to the appeal, or on his 
counsel, varies in accordance with the statu-
tory provisions and rules of the court in the 
particular jurisdiction, and the effect of 
such a failure also depends, to some extent, 
at least, on the facts and circumstances of 
the case. Thus, a failure properly to serve 
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the brief may cause the appellate court to 
refuse to consider the brief; counsel may be 
subjected to a penalty, although it may not 
be grounds for dismissal; it may be grounds 
for dismissal, in the discretion of the 
court, . . . (emphasis added) 
It is not for the appellant to dictate what penalty should be 
assessed for the Department of Employment Security's failure to 
provide appellant with a copy of the brief of the employee at the 
administrative level. It should probably not be a dismissal of the 
appeal at the administrative level. However, inasmuch as the 
Department of Employment Security generally represents the 
employee's interests before the Board of Review, for failure to 
provide appellant's counsel a copy of the employee's brief at the 
administrative level the penalty, at the very least, should be that 
those materials submitted by the employee should not be considered 
as part of the record on appeal. In any event, the appellant has 
clearly been denied procedural due process at the administrative 
level and deprived of the opportunity to submit a reply brief. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, appellant maintains that both the 
Board of Review and the Administrative Law Judge erred in granting 
the employee the benefit of unemployment security payments. In 
addition, just cause has been misdefined by the Department of 
Employment Security. Finally, this appellant was denied procedural 
due process at the administrative level. The appellant, Logan 
Regional Hospital, therefore requests that this Court reverse the 
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decision of the Board of Review and enter an order denying unem-
ployment compensation benefits to the employee, Abdul H. Dailami. 
Dated this £7*y day of September, 1985. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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POSITION DESCRIPTION (NON-EXEMPT) 
'ION 1 1 1 1 £l 




Be i lei 'Operator 
Manager of Plant Operations 
Plant Operations 
DATE: 







XT general supervision, the boiler operator is accountable for performing corrective 
preventive maintenance of all boilers and boiler related equipment and other building 
>ort equipment located in the mechanical area. 
JRE AND SCOPE 
Knowledge 
incumbent must be epxerienced m the appropriate operation of 350 HP or larger boilers. 
Lcensed boiler operator is preferred. The incumbent must demonstrate knowledge of low and 
i"pressure steam boilers, and understanding of boiler de-airators, chemical feed systems, 
maintaining appropriate fluid levels. Must be familiar with the operation of large 
5T chillers, compressors, vacuum pumps, and large three phase motor pumping systems. The 
umbent must have knowledge and experience of water coolers,serpentine maintenance, and 
am traps repair and maintenance, and in pumping systems, water theimodynamic cycles, 
flow and air cleanliness. 
erpersonal Skills 
incumbent deals frequently on a face-to-face basis with hospital employees, department 
agers, and employees within the immediate work group and must therefore possess quality 
erpersonal relationship skills. 
ipment Operated 
• incumbent operates manual and electrical equipment related to boiler maintenance, includi 
nches, pipe threaders, fittings, and pumps. The incumbent also operates manual and electr 
. tools related to preventive maintenance or repair of the physical plant, including 
.ders, grinders, voltage meters, spray guns, etc. 
jiking Requirements/Decision Making 
* incumbent is responsible for conducting routine tests on the boiler equipment and 
:ermining that it is operating safely and efficiently. When problems in systems operation 
0141 
occur, the incumbent is responsible for determining the cause of breakdown and 
restoring the system to proper operation. The incumbent attends department meetings 
where the department manager provides safety instructions, discusses hospital 
procedures, and any other necessary items. The department manager is available 
for assistance when necessary. When additional equipment or more time is required 
to complete an approved job, the incumbent obtains approval from the department 
manager. 
Rsults of Work: 
All preventive and corrective maintenance to boilers and boiler related equipment, 
including steam sterilizers, water pumps, cooling towers, and hot water tanks must 
be completed in an efficient and timely manner to the satisfaction of the department 
manager and to meet safety codes and insurance regulations. The incumbent must be 
aware of the hazards of working with electrical equipment, hot water and steam. 
Implications of error include damage to the building or equipment and injury to the 
employee. 
PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTABILITIES 
1. Responsible for the safe and appropriate operation of glycol systems, penthouse 
• heating and cooling systems, and penthouse air handling systems. 
2. Performs routine checks on steam gauges, fuel levels, and other liquid levels. 
3. Maintains and repairs steam traps, de-airation equipment, vacuum pumps, com-
pressors, and other special equipment. 
4. Responsible for the safe and appropriate operation of hospital dual 350 HP 
boilers. 
5. Performs preventive maintenance on all equipment in assigned areas. 
6. Responsible for the appropriate operation of water softeners and water heaters. 
'7. Trouble shoots the boiler system, including filling the boiler, getting up 
steam, and maintaining the water level. 
8. Analyzes problems in boiler operation and restores operation when common 
problems occur. 
9. Performs all routine tests to boiler and other hot water and steam systems, 
including assuring proper chemical balance in feed pumps, routine documentation 
of boiler operating pressure, and routine temperature checks on hot water to* 
the building. 
10. Performs inspections to the boiler and related components as required by law 
or insurance carriers and maintains appropriate documentation of such. 
11. Maintains cleanliness of work areas and performs repairs on required or assigned 
equipment. 
12. Responsible for maintenance and repair of deionized system. 
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Page 3 of 3 
13. Responsible for maintenance and operation of the honeywell compressors. 
14. Ki •• * i ncinerator. 
Working Conditions: 
The incumbent works in a clean working environment except when working above the 
ceiling or working with a serious steam or hot water leak. The incumbent frequently 
lifts up to 100 pounds. Possible dangers on the job include electrical shock 
and injury from hot water or steam. The incumbent is exposed to constant medium 
level noise from the boilers and equipment in the mechanical area. The incumbent must 
work safely with caustic chemicals. 
OIJ;J 
§ 4141.29 PAGE'S OHIO REVISED CODE ANNOTATED 104 
grant a writ of mandamus requiring the board of review to 
schedule a hearing on the question of whether the claimant 
is entitled to unemployment compensation benefits: State 
ex rel. Cox v. Lopeman, 13 OApp3d 192, 130 OBR 239, 
468 NE2d 781. 
25. (1984) The common pleas court, in an appeal from 
an administrative agency, must give due deference to the 
agency's resoluton of evidentiary conflicts and the court 
may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. If, 
at the agency level, a preponderance of reliable, probative 
and substantial evidence exists, the common pleas court 
must affirm the agency's decision: Budd Co. v. Mercer, 14 
OApp3d 269, 14 OBR 298, 471 NE2d 151. 
26. (1984) Under RC § 4141.28(0), it is proper for the 
trial court to dismiss the appeal of an unemployment com-
pensation claimant who failed to provide a copy of the 
notice of appeal to the board of review, where, due to this 
failure, the board was unable to provide the court with a 
transcript of the record: Palic v. Garland Floor Co., 14 
OApp3d 297, 14 OBR 354, 471 NE2d 164. 
27. (1984) A court of common pleas may not substitute 
its judgment for that of the unemployment compensation 
board of review on factual issues, and may modify the 
board's decision and enter final judgment only where the 
facts are not in dispute and such undisputed facts are deter-
minative of the issues. Where, however, the referee has no 
conflicting testimony and evidence, the referee's decision 
may be reversed if no substantial evidence supports it: 
Wilson v. Bd. of Review, 14 OApp3d 309, 14 OBR 374, 
471 NE2d 168. 
28. (1984) In dealing with a claim that the judgment is 
against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing 
court can reverse only if the verdict is so manifesdy con-
trary to the natural and reasonable inferences to be drawn 
from the evidence as to produce a result in complete viola-
tion of substantial justice: Sambunjak v. Bd. of Review, 14 
OApp3d 432, 14 OBR 550, 471 NE2d 835. 
§ 4 1 4 1 . 2 9 Eligibility and qualification for 
benefits. 
Each eligible individual shall receive benefits as 
compensation for loss of remuneration due to in-
voluntary total or partial unemployment in the 
amounts and subject to the conditions stipulated in 
sections 4141.01 to 4141.46 of the Revised Code. 
(A) No individual is entitled to a waiting period 
or benefits for any week unless he: 
(1) Has filed a valid application for determina-
tion of benefit rights in accordance with section 
4141.28 of the Revised Code; 
(2) Has made a claim for benefits In accordance 
with section 4141.28 of the Revised Code; 
(3) Has registered at an employment office or 
other registration place maintained or designated by 
the administrator of the bureau of employment ser-
vices. Registration shall be made in person or in 
writing in accordance with the time limits, frequen-
cy, and manner prescribed by the administrator. 
(4) (a) Is able to work and available for suitable 
work and is actively seeking suitable work either in 
a locality in which he has earned wrages subject to 
Chapter 4141. of the Revised Code, during his base 
period, or if he leaves such locality, then in a locality 
where suitable work is normally performed. 
The administrator may waive the requirement 
that a claimant be actively seeking work when he 
finds that an individual has been laid off and the 
employer who laid him off has notified the ad-
ministrator within ten days after the layoff, that 
work is expected to be available for the individual 
within a specified number of days not to exceed 
forty-five calendar days following the last day the 
individual worked. In the event the individual is not 
recalled within the specified period, such waiver 
shall cease to be operative with respect to such 
layoff. 
(b) The individual shall be instructed as to the ef-
forts that he must make in his search for suitable 
work, except where the active search for work re-
quirement has been waived under division (A)(4)(a) 
of this section, and shall keep a record of where and 
when he has sought work in complying with such in-
structions and shall, upon request, produce such 
record for examination by the administrator. 
(c) An individual who is attending a training 
course, approved by the Ohio worker training 
committee or the administrator, meets the require-
ment of this division, if such attendance was recom-
mended by the administrator and the individual is 
regularly attending the course, and is making satis-
factory progress. An individual also meets the re-
quirements of this division if he is participating and 
advancing in a training program, as defined in divi-
sion (P)"of section 5709.61 of the Revised Code, and 
if an enterprise defined in division (B) of section 
5709.61 of the Revised Code is paying all or part of 
the cost of the individual's participation in the train-
ing program with the intention of hiring the indivi-
dual for employment as a new employee as defined 
in division (L) of section 5709.61 of the Revised 
Code for at least ninety days after the individual's 
completion of the training program. 
(d) An individual who becomes unemployed 
while attending a regularly established school and 
whose base period credit weeks were earned in 
whole or in part while attending such school, meets 
the availability and active search for work re-
quirements of division (A)(4)(a) of this section if he 
makes himself available on any shift of hours for 
suitable employment with his most recent employer 
or any other employer in his base period, or for any 
other suitable employment to which he is directed, 
under Chapter 4141. of the Revised Code. 
(e) The administrator shall adopt such rules as he 
deems necessary for the administration of division 
(A)(4) of this section, 
(f) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this 
section, no otherwise eligible individual shall be 
denied benefits for any week because he or she is in 
training approved under section 236 (a)(1) of the 
"Trade Act of 1974," 88 Stat. 1978, 19 U.S.C. 2296, 
nor shall such individual be denied benefits by 
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reason of leaving work to enter such training, pro-
vided the work left is not suitable employment, or 
because of the application to any week in training of 
provisions in Chapter 4141. of the Revised Code, or 
any applicable federal unemployment compensa-
tion law, relating to availability for work, active 
search for work, or refusal to accept work. 
For the purposes of division (A)(4)(f) of this sec-
tion, "suitable employment" means with respect to 
an individual, work of a substantially equal or 
higher skill level than the individual's past adversely 
affected emplovment, as defined for the purposes of 
the "Trade Act of 1974," 88 Stat. 1978, 19 U.S.C. 
2101, and wages for such work at not less than 
eighty per cent of the individual's average weekly 
wage as determined for the purposes of that federal 
act. 
(5) Is unable to obtain suitable work. 
(B) An individual suffering total or partial 
unemployment is eligible for benefits for unemploy-
ment occurring subsequent to a waiting period of 
one week and no benefits shall be payable during 
this required waiting period, but no more than one 
week of waiting period shall be required of any such 
individual in any benefit year in order to establish 
his eligibility for total or partial unemployment 
benefits except that, notwithstanding any other pro-
visions of Chapter 4141. of the Revised Code, when 
an individual qualifies within his benefit year for 
three consecutive compensable weeks of total 
unemployment occurring any.Jime after the re-
quired waiting period, he shall be patd benefits for 
his waiting period claim in accordance with the 
terms of Chapter 4141. of the Revised Code, except 
that an individual who first files an application for 
benefits during calendar years 1983, 1984, and 1985 
shall not be paid benefits for his waiting week after 
he qualifies within his benefit year for three con-
secutive compensable weeks of total unemployment. 
(C) The waiting period for total or partial 
unemployment shall commence on the first day of 
the first week with respect to which the individual 
first files a claim for benefits at an employment of-
fice or other place of registration maintained or 
designated by the administrator or on the first day 
of the first week with respect to which he has other-
wise filed a claim for benefits in accordance with the 
rules and regulations of the bureau of employment 
services, provided such claim is allowed by the ad-
ministrator or his deputy. 
(Dffl&**W*te^^ 
®?rer»e?its under the following conditions: 
(1) For any. week withrjespec^^wttfeff TSggbd-
-^ minis tratorfiTrds"that: 
*:^ a£ Bis- u**rapkjymeirt was due to a laoor dispute 
otner than a lockout at any factory, establishment, 
or etfaf§* pieiaisesiocated in this or any other state 
and owned or operated by the employer by which 
he is or was last employed; and for so long as his 
unemployment is due to such labor dispute. No in-
dividual shall be disqualified under this provision if: 
(i) His employment was with such employer at 
any factory, establishment, or premises located in 
this state, owned or operated by such employer, 
other than the factory, establishment, or premises at 
which the labor dispute exists, if it is shown that he 
is not financing, participating in, or directly in-
terested in such labor dispute; or 
(ii) His employment was with an employer not in-
volved in the labor dispute but whose place of 
business was located within the same premises as the 
employer engaged in the dispute, unless his 
employer is a wholly owned subsidiary of the 
employer engaged in the dispute, or unless he active-
ly participates in or voluntarily stops work because 
of such dispute. If it is established that the claimant 
was laid off for an indefinite period and not recalled 
to work prior to the dispute, or was separated by the 
employer prior to the dispute for reasons other than 
the labor dispute, or that he obtained a bona fide 
job with another employer while the dispute was 
still in progress, such labor dispute shall not render 
the employee ineligible for benefits. 
(b) He has been given a disciplinary layoff for 
misconduct in connection with his work. 
(2) For the duration of his* unemployment if the 
administrator finds that: 
(a) He quit his work without just cause qrr has 
Been discharged for just cause in connection with his 
work, provided division (D)(2) of this section does 
not apply to the separation of a person under any of 
the following circumstances: 
(i) Separation from employment for the purpose 
of entering the armed forces of the United States if 
he makes application to enter, or is inducted into 
such armed forces within thirty days after such 
separation; 
(ii) Separation from employment pursuant to a 
labor-management contract or agreement, or pur-
suant to an established employer plan, program, or 
policy, which permits the employee, because of lack 
of work, to accept a separation from employment; 
(iii) He has left his employment to accept a recall 
from a prior employer or to accept other employ-
ment "as provided under section 4141.291 [4141.-
29.1] of the Revised Code, or has left employment 
which is or was concurrent employment where the 
remuneration, hours, or other conditions of such 
employment are substantially less favorable than his 
other work wrhich was performed during such con-
current employment and where such employment, 
if offered as new work, would be considered not 
suitable under the provisions of divisions (E) and (F) 
of this section. Any benefits which would otherwise 
be chargeable to the account of the employer from 
whom an individual has left employment under 
conditions described in division (D)(2)(a)(iii) of this 
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of the judgment of the common pleas court 
upon its jurisdiction. Thus, the issue 
raised by appellee's motion is the issue 
presented by the merits of the appeal. A 
motion to dismiss could be sustained under 
such circumstances only if it be determined 
that the appeal has no arguable merit. 
In this case, however, not only does the 
motion to dismiss raise an issue that can 
be determined only by a review of the rec-
ord on appeal, but appellant raises an issue 
independent of the jurisdictional issue 
raised by appellee by contending to the 
effect that its complaint states a claim for 
relief in declaratory judgment. 
While this court is bound by the de-
cisions of the Supreme Court, which would 
be applicable if the record on appeal re-
veals the facts to be as claimed by appellee, 
this is one of the main issues raised by the 
merits of the appeal itself. A motion to 
dismiss is not the proper method for an 
appellee to contest the merits of an appeal, 
at least unless it be a frivolous appeal. 
Here, however, the appellee has appar-
ently confused the jurisdictional requisites 
for the common pleas court with those for 
this court, which are established by R. C. 
2501.02, 2505.02, 2505.03 and 4141.26(B) 
and Section 3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio 
Constitution. R. C. 4141.26(B) specifically 
provides that the judgment of the common 
pleas court may be appealed "as in ordi-
nary civil cases." 
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is 
overruled. 
Motion overruled. 
REILLY and MCCORMAC, JJ., concur. 
[1f9464] Winters National Bank <fc Trust Co. v. Bd. of Rev., et al. Ohio Court 
of Common Pleas, Montgomery County. No. 81-3363, 12/29/82. 
Discharge for misconduct—Manner of performing work—Accumulation of errors.— 
Just cause for discharging an employee can be the employee's inability to meet the stand-
ards and procedures of the employer which are made known to the employee, and 
violations, mistakes and poor work attitude can accumulate until the totality constitutes 
"just cause for discharge." Accordingly, where a bank employee knew the rules of the 
bank and was warned of the consequences of future infractions, but where future infrac-
tions occurred, this was just cause for her discharge. See Ohio fl 1970.52, 
MACMILLAN, JR., J.: The Appellant-Em-
ployer filed its Notice of Appeal from the 
decision of the Board of Review which 
disallowed the application to institute a 
further appeal. The decision of the Referee, 
Joseph F. Weinle, dated September 23t 
1981, is the subject of the Appellant's 
appeal. 
The Court, having reviewed the proceed-
ings and the transcript of the testimony 
before the Referee, finds that the Referee's 
decision is unreasonable and against the 
manifest weight of the evidence. 
It is certain from the transcript (Pages 
23-28) that Donna K. Woods knew the 
rules of the bank and was warned of con-
sequences of future infraction. There 
were future infractions. Further, there is 
no legal requirement that an employer 
somehow blot from its memory the infrac-
tions for which there was not an immediate 
termination. From the Referee's decision, 
it appears that he is of the opinion that 
unless an employee performs a willful or 
a wrongful act, the employer must accept 
sloppy work and continue employing the 
error-prone person. But just cause for 
discharging an employee can be and should 
be the employee's inability to meet the 
standards and procedures of the employer 
which are made known to the employee. 
Violations, mistakes and poor work atti-
tude can accumulate until the totality con-
stitutes "just cause for discharge." In 
this case, the conduct of Donna K. Woods 
required termination of her employment 
because the essence of confidence in banks 
is dependent upon the exactness, the trust-
worthiness, and the attitude of the em-
ployee meeting the public. 
The Administrator's decision was a rea-
sonable one, not the Referee's decision. 
The Court finds the Referee's decision 
is unreasonable and against the manifest 
weight of the evidence, that his decision 
be overruled, and the decision of the Ad-
ministrator be AFFIRMED. 
This Order is intended as a final order 
from which an appeal may be taken. 
Copies of the above are hereby sent to 
all parties listed below by ordinary mail 
on this date of filing. 
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4141.28(0) and R. C 4141.01(1), in the 
case at bar, we find that the lower court 
erred in holding that it had subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear Nurse's appeal. 
Summary 
We accordingly hold that the trial court 
properly affirmed the Board of Review's 
Opinion 
HOFSTETTER, P. J.: The Board of Review 
of the Ohio Board of Employment services 
determined that the appellant quit his em 
ployment without just cause. 
Appellant then filed a timely notice of 
appeal to the Common Pleas Court, but 
failed to serve notice on the Administrator 
of the Bureau of Employment Services. 
An amended notice of appeal, with leave 
of court, was served on the Administrator 
after the thirty-day time limit had expired. 
The Attorney General filed a motion to 
dismiss the appeal, which was granted by 
the Common Pleas Court The appellant 
has appealed that dismissal, assigning three 
errors, as follows: 
1. Based on the express statutory lan-
guage of Ohio Revised Code 4141.28(0) 
and the facts of this case, it was error 
for the court below to find that failure 
to join the Administrator of the Ohio 
Bureau of Employment Services as a 
party-appellee was a jurisdictional de 
feet 
2. Since the court allowed the admin-
istrator to be joined as a party pursuant 
to leave of court having been granted, 
it was error for the court to dismiss 
the appeal since joinder of the admin-
istrator did not rise to the level of a 
jurisdictional defect but was procedural 
only. 
3. Based on the liberal construction 
afforded to party appellants pursuant to 
decision and we overruled both of appel-
lants assignments of error. Additionally, 
upon the cross-assignment of error we 
conclude the trial court was without ju-
risdiction to hear the appeal from the Board's 
decision. We, therefore, affirm the decision 
of the court of common pleas. 
the Ohio Revised Code section 4141.46 
and remedial laws in general, it was error 
for the court below to dismiss the within 
appeal without hearing the case on its 
merits. 
This court has addressed the issue raised 
herein at least twice during the past eigh-
teen months, as noted in the appellees' 
briefs. We held that failure to serve the 
Administrator or any other interested party 
to such appeal is a failure to perfect the 
appeal, and the Common Pleas Court ac-
quires no jurisdiction of said appeal. Our 
thinking in that regard has been confirmed 
by the Supreme Court in In re Claim of 
King (1980), 62 Ohio St. 2d 87. That 
court, in a unanimous per curiam opinion, 
said in part: 
In order to perfect an appeal under 
R. C. 4141.28(0), the statute explicitly 
requires that the party appealing serve 
all other interested parties with notice. 
Appellee herein failed to follow this di-
rective when he failed to serve notice 
on appellant Therefore, this court finds 
that the Court of Common Pleas lacked 
subject-matter jurisdiction in this matter. 
• * *. 
Appellee's reliance on our decision in 
Joy Mfg. Co. v. Albaugh (1953), 159 Ohio 
S t 460, is misplaced. In that case we 
interpreted the predecessor statute to 
the current R. C. 4141.28(0). The 
earlier statute did not so clearly mandate 
that the administrator of the Bureau of 
Employment Services be served with 
notice, as does the present statute. 
[tT 9347] Herman W. Jones v. Glavic Motors, Inc., et al. Ohio Court of Appeals, 
Lake County. No. 8-049, 3/2/81. Before DAHUNG, P. J., HOFSTETTER, J. and COOK, J. 
Claims and appeals procedure—Taking and perfecting proceeding's for review—Notice 
—Filing, sufficiency.—As the court was without jurisdiction to hear an appeal because 
the appellant failed to serve the Administrator, the court was without authority to grant 
leave to amend the appeal after the thirty-day time limit for appeal had expired. See 
Ohio 1T 2020.72. 
Claims and appeals procedure—Jurisdiction and powers of tribunal.—When the trial 
court is without jurisdiction to hear an appeal on, its merits, it has no legal alternative 
other than dismissal. See Ohio fl 2020.40. 
Eugene M. Adelman, 28833 Euclid Ave., Wickliffe, Ohio 44092, for plaintiff-appellant. 
Ronald Zele, 26111 Brush Ave., Euclid, Ohio 44132, and Q. Albert Corsi, Asst. Atty. 
Gen., 810 The Lausche Bldg., 615 W. Superior Ave., Cleveland, Ohio 44113, for appellees. 
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(Tr. 28) Q. And you're saying you 
spilled about 300 gallons? 
A. Approximately. 
Q. Did you report this to anyone? 
A. I didn't get to talk to the dis-
patcher that morning, but I told him that 
evening when I come in. 
Q. And that was when he fired you 
though, right? 
A. Right 
The decision of the referee found that 
Claimant was discharged for just cause in 
connection with work, and mat the dis-
qualification for benefits was properly im-
posed by the administrator, which decision 
of the administrator., upon being recon-
sidered by the referee, was affirmed. 
Application to institute further appeal 
was disallowed by the Board of Review, 
Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Services. 
The Common Pleas Court rendered judg-
ment finding the decision of the Board 
of Review not to be unlawful, unreasonable, 
or against the manifest weight of the evi-
dence. 
On appeal to this Court, Claimant-Ap-
pellant has not set forth any separately 
specified Assignments of Error in com-
pliance with Rule 16(A)(2), Ohio Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
W e do not find the judgment of the 
Common Pleas Court appealed from to 
be either against the manifest weight of 
the evidence or contrary to law, and no 
error prejudicial to Appellant appearing, the 
judgment appealed from is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
[1J9346] Stephanie E. Nurse v. Bd\ of Rev* and Firestone Tire & Rubber Company, 
Inc. Ohio Court of Appeals, Summit County. N a 9836, 2/18/81. 
Discharge for misconduct—Manner of performing work—Accumulation of errors.—A 
claimant was discharged for just cause where she was discharged due to sleeping on the 
job, tardiness, absenteeism, fighting, negligence and "poor work," notwithstanding her 
contention that it was error as a matter of law to find just cause where she did not receive 
notice that future infractions would subject her entire work record to review for con-
sideration of termination. See Ohio fl 1970.52. 
Claims and appeals procedure—Taking and perfecting proceedings for review—Notice 
—Filing, sufficiency.—The court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal 
where the appellant failed to name the Administrator as an appellee in the suit and to 
serve him with a copy of the notice of appeal. See Ohio tf 2020.72. 
Claims and appeals procedure—Jurisdiction and powers of tribunal.—The issue of 
subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the lower court proceeding or 
the appeal. See Ohio fl 2020.40. 
Decision and Journal Entry 
This cause was heard January 7, 1981, 
upon the record in the trial court, and the 
briefs. It was argued by counsel for the 
parties and submitted to the court. We 
have reviewed each assignment of error and 
make the following disposition: 
MAHONEY, J.: The lower court denied the 
attorney general's and Firestone Tire and 
Rubber Company's, defendants-appellees, 
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, but affirmed the Board of Re-
view of Employment Services' decision that 
Stephanie Nurse, plaintiff-appellant, was dis-
charged for just cause. We affirm the de-
cision of the lower court, and also hold that 
the lower court erred in finding that it had 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
Facts 
The Board of Review of Employment 
Services held on November 6, 1979, that 
Unemployment Insurance Reports 
Stephanie Nurse was not entitled to un-
employment compensation benefits because 
Firestone Tire and Rubber Company (here-
after Firestone) discharged her for just 
cause. Nurse appealed the Board's decision 
to the court of common pleas. 
In Nurse's notice of appeal filed with the 
lower court, Nurse failed to name the ad-
ministrator of the Ohio Bureau of Employ-
ment Services as a party to the suit, nor did 
Nurse serve a copy of the notice of appeal 
upon the administrator. Nurse's amended 
notice of appeal was also delinquent in the 
above mentioned respects. 
The attorney general moved to dismiss 
the case on the grounds that the common 
pleas court lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion to hear the appeal since the adminis-
trator had not been named an appellee to 
the suit and because no copy of the notice 
of appeal had been served upon the ad-
ministrator. The court denied the attorney 
Ohio 1 $346 
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general's motion, and, on January 22, 1980, 
the court granted Nurse's motion to make 
the administrator a party. 
The common pleas court affirmed the de-
cision of the Board of Review that Nurse 
had been discharged for just cause. Nurse 
appealed the lower court's affirmance of the 
Board's decision. Through a cross assign-
ment of error, the attorney general and 
Firestone appealed the lower court's hold-
ing that it had subject matter jurisdiction. 
Neither the attorney general nor Firestone 
filed a notice of appeal with this court. 
Assignments of Error 
1. It was error for the court to affirm 
the decision of the Board of Review since 
there was no substantial, reliable and pro-
bative evidence to show that appellant 
acted in willful disregard of her em-
ployer's best interest. 
2. It was error, as a matter of law, for 
the court to find that the discharge was 
for just cause since, under the circum-
stances of this case, appellant was en-
titled to notice that any future infrac-
tions would subject her entire work 
record to review for consideration on 
whether to terminate her. 
Our review of this appeal is very narrow 
and limited solely to determine if the com-
mon pleas court acted properly in affirming 
the Board of Review's decision. We concur 
in its finding that the Board of Review's 
decision was lawful, reasonable and clearly 
supported by virtually all of the evidence. 
Its decision was completely supported by 
substantial, probative and reliable evidence. 
Appellant's argument that she was entitled 
to a warning that future infractions would 
result in a review of her whole record and 
possibly invoke discharge are specious at 
best Even under the appellant's definitions 
of "just cause," we fail to see where "sleep-
ing on the job, tardiness, absenteeism, fight-
ing, negligence, and just plain 'poor work,' " 
are in the employer's best interest or work 
ing to the best of one's ability. 
Preliminary Discussion of the 
Assignment of Error 
Nurse argues that: 
This court is without jurisdiction to 
consider the issue raised in appellant's 
cross assignment of error since the ap-
pellee failed to file a proper, timely notice 
of appeal. 
R. C. 2505.22 provides: 
Assignments of error may be filed on 
behalf of an appellee which shall be passed 
upon by a reviewing court before a judg-
Ohio 11 9346 
ment or order is reversed in whole or in 
part. The time within which assignments 
of error on behalf of an appellee may be 
filed shall be fixed by rule of court. 
In Parton v. Weilnau, 169 Ohio St. 145, 
171 (1959), the Supreme Court, in constru-
ing R. C. 2505.22, held: 
* * * that an assignment of error by 
an appellee, where such appellee has not 
filed any notice of appeal from the judg-
ment of the lower court, may be used by 
the appellee as a shield to protect the 
judgment of the lower court but may not 
be used by the appellee as a sword to 
destroy or modify that judgment. 
• * * 
Since 'the attorney general and Firestone, 
in the present case, seek to have the lower 
court's judgment affirmed rather than mod-
ified or destroyed, this court will consider 
the attorney general's and Firestone's cross 
assignment of error 
Additionally appellee argues that subject 
matter jurisdiction may be raised at any 
stage of the lower court proceeding or the 
appeal. We agree. Our Supreme Court in 
Jenkins v. Keller, 6 Ohio St. 2d 122 (1966) 
held that 
Where a court has no jurisdiction over 
the subject matter of an action or an 
appeal, a challenge to jurisdiction on such 
ground may effectively be made for the 
first time on appeal in a reviewing court 
We do not determine for purposes of this 
appeal whether an actual notice of appeal 
or cross-appeal was required by the appellees. 
Appellee's Cross Assignment 
of Error 
The common pleas court erred in overrul-
ing the motions to dismiss submitted by 
the office of the attorney general and by 
the employer. 
The Supreme Court and this court in 
numerous decisions have held that R. C. 
4141.28(0) and R. C. 4141.01(1) require 
an appellant in an appeal of a decision of 
the Board of Review to name the admin-
istration as an appellee in the suit and to 
serve him with a copy of the notice of 
appeal. In re Claim of King, 62 Ohio St. 
2d 87 (1980); Sullivan v. Kaiser Engineers, 
62 Ohio St. 2d 304 (1980); U. S. Steel v. 
Board of Review, Lorain N o 2967 (9th Dist. 
Ct. App., May 14, 1980); Joseph Bagdonas 
v. Board of Review, Summit No. 9648 (9th 
Dist. C t App., May 28, 1980). In re Claim 
of: Vanessa T. Woolfork, Lorain No. 2996 
(9th Dist. Ct. App., September 3, 1980). 
Because Nurse did not comply with the 
abovementioned requirements of R. C. 
© 1981, Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 
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capacity beyond March 1, 1980, until 
subsequent to the date of her delivery 
in May, 1980. As claimant was not physi-
cally able to work during the week end-
ing March 29, 1980, the claim for said 
week must be disallowed. 
Ample evidence exists in the record to 
support the finding that claimant made no 
attempt to talk to someone in personnel 
concerning work for her other than as a 
flight attendant after December 2, 1979, and 
the fact that claimant never attempted to 
have her name removed from the medical 
sick list nor to terminate the medical leave 
of absence despite a second physician's 
more favorable report. Therefore, claimant 
did not sustain her burden of proof as to 
entitlement to benefits. This Court will not 
disturb the administrative agency's fact and 
credibility determinations. 
Therefore, it is ordered that the decision 
of the Board of Review to disallow any 
further appeal is affirmed. The decision of 
the Referee denying unemployment bene-
fits to appellant was lawful, reasonable and 
supported by the manifest weight of the 
evidence pursuant to O. R. C Section 
4141.28(0). 
Appellant is to pay the costs of this appeal. 
fl[ 9449] Willie L. Steagall v. Bd. of Rev. and Earle M. Jorgensen Co., Allan United 
Steel Division, et aL Ohio Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton County. No. A-8009521, 
2/9/82. 
Discharge for misconduct—Manner of performing work—Quality of work.—A 
claimant was discharged for just cause where, in a two-year period, a total of 30 invoices 
on which he had worked involved errors and required adjustments, where he had 13 
counselling sessions with his employer, where he received a three-day disciplinary layoff 
after which he committed errors on three more occasions, and where the claimant 
admitted a number of errors in his work, including one mistake that cost his employer 
$1,100. See Ohio tf 1970.55. 
Claims and appeals procedure—Cross-examination.—Although the claimant was not 
permitted to cross-examine his employer's witness, the hearing on his claim for benefits 
was fair where the Referee did not formally invite cross-examination by the unrepresented 
claimant, but where the Referee did question the employer's representative at the urging 
of the claimant, and where, at the conclusion of the hearing, the claimant acknowledged 
the hearing had "covered everything." See Ohio fl 2020. 
Claims and appeals procedure—Evidence—Hearsay.—Although the claimant argued 
that he had not received a fair hearing because the Referee had based his decision sub-
stantially on evidence that was hearsay on hearsay, the Referee may admit and accept 
hearsay, and the employer's representative who testified had personal knowledge of the 
events leading to discharge. The exhibits were prepared by the employer's representative 
and the claimant acknowledged their authenticity, and another exhibit contained business 
records, which are an exception to the hearsay rule. See Ohio fl 2020.23. 
Simon, Anninos & Namanworth Co., L. P. A., Eli Namanworth, 408 Gwynne Bldg., 
602 Main St., Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for plaintiff-appellant. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, 
Lawrence C. Mackowiak, First National Bank Center, Fountain Square, Cincinnati, Ohio 
45202, for defendant-appellee, Earle M. Jorgensen Co. Richard H. Lippert, Asst. Atty. 
Gen., OBES, 1812 Central Parkway, Cincinnati, Ohio 45214. 
GORMAN, J.: Plaintiff-Appellant, Willie L. 
Steagall, has appealed from the decision of 
the referee and the Board of Review, Ohio 
Bureau of Employment Services denying 
his claim for unemployment compensation 
benefits. His appeal presents the following 
issues: (1) did plaintiff receive a fair hear-
ing, and (2) was the decision against the 
manifest weight of the evidence? It was 
submitted upon the certified record and the 
memoranda of counsel. 
Between March 6, 1978 and June 30, 1980 
plaintiff was employed as a "burner" by 
defendant-appellee, Earle M. Jorgensen Co. 
(Jorgensen). His duties were to cut steel 
according to customer specifications. In 
1978 eight invoices and in 1979 twenty-two 
invoices upon which he worked involved 
errors and required adjustments. He had 
thirteen counselling sessions with his em-
ployer agreeing each time to improve his 
performance. On May 23, 1980 he received 
a three day disciplinary layoff because of 
cutting errors. When he returned, he com-
mitted errors on three more occasions. On 
June 30, 1980 Jorgensen discharged plaintiff 
for careless and negligent work. 
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Plaintiff argues he did not receive a fair 
hearing because he was not permitted to 
cross-examine defendant's witness and be-
cause the referee based his decision sub-
stantially on evidence that was hearsay on 
hearsay. Under R. C. §4141.28(J) the re-
feree in conducting the hearing is not bound 
by common law or statutory rules of evi-
dence or by technical or formal rules of 
procedure, but he is to conduct the hearing 
in such a way as to ascertain the facts and 
to determine if a claimant is entitled to 
benefits. The right to confront and to 
cross-examine are fundamental to a fan-
hearing. After Sims, the employer's wit-
ness, testified, the referee did not formally 
invite cross-examination by plaintiff who 
was unrepresented by counsel. However, 
the record conclusively reveals the referee 
thoroughly questioned Sims at plaintiffs 
urging (Tr. 27-30, 32-33, 35-40), and in fact, 
when plaintiff was testifying did cross ex-
amine on plaintiffs behalf as illustrated by 
the following example (Tr. 32): 
Mr. Steagall: Ask him—ask: him how 
much did they burn. 
Referee: Well, how much did they burn, 
Mr. Sims? 
Mr. Sims: May I preference this a little 
bit? etc. . 
Furthermore, at the conclusion of the hear-
ing plaintiff acknowledged the hearing 
''covered everything," (Tr. 40). 
Plaintiff also argues he was denied a fair 
hearing because the employer's evidence 
was totally hearsay on hearsay. The referee 
may admit and accept hearsay. Simon v. 
Lake Geauga Printing Co. (1982) 69 Ohio 
St. 2d 41. This case does not present the 
unfair situation where the testimony of the 
employer's witness who is unacquainted 
with the facts, is accepted as more credible 
than the claimant's testimony. Gipson v. 
Board of Review, 8 CCH UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE REPORTS, Ohio 1T 9356 (C. P. 
Hamilton Co. 1973). In this case not only 
did the witness, Sims, have personal knowl-
edge, repeated counselling for his alleged 
substandard performance did occur. In ad-
dition, the employer's Exhibits 1 and 2 were 
prepared by Sims and plaintiff acknowl-
edged they were authentic (Tr. 18). Ex-
hibit 2 appears to contain, what if qualified, 
were business records, an exception to the 
hearsay rule under Evid. R. 803(6), and 
Exhibit 1 is nothing more than a docu-
mented narrative prepared by the witness. 
No prejudicial or unfair advantage was 
gained by the employer in their admission. 
Although conflicting evidence appears in 
the record, plaintiff admits a number of 
errors in his work including one mistake 
that cost Jorgensen $1,100 (Tr. 26). Plain-
tiff maintains Jorgensen terminated him 
because of reduced work. However, there 
is substantial evidence in the record in 
which the referee could conclude plaintiff 
was discharged for just cause and his de-
cision and the decision of the Board of Re-
view are not unlawful, unreasonable or 
against the manifest weight of the evidence 
as set forth in R. C §4141.28(0) and under 
the authority of DeCaro v. Bd. of Rev., 8 
CCH UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE REPORTS, 
Ohio 1F9356 (App. Cuyahoga 1981). Judg-
ment affirmed. 
Counsel will present an endorsed entry 
reflecting the Court's decision by no later 
than February 20, 1982. 
[ff9450] Willie L. Steagall v. Bd. of Rev., Earle M. Jorgensen Co., and Allan United 
Steel Division. Ohio Court of Appeals, First District, Hamilton County. No. C-820236, 
12/29/82. Before KEEFE, P. J., and BLACK and DOAN, J J. 
Discharge for misconduct—Manner of performing work—Quality of work.—A 
claimant was discharged for just cause where he was responsible for more than 40 
instances of careless work and had 13 personal counselling interviews with his superiors 
directed at improving the erratic quality of his work. See Ohio fl 1970.55. 
Claims and appeals procedure—Evidence—Hearsay.—Where a claimant asserted 
that a hearing was unfair because he was not advised of the objectionable character of 
the employer's hearsay evidence and that much of the evidence was double hearsay, the 
assertions had no merit since formal rules of evidence do not apply in unemployment 
compensation proceedings. The claim of prejudice by double hearsay was without foun-
dation where facts testified to by the employer's representative that were beyond his 
personal knowledge were in the nature of either business records or summaries of 
records or were already properly before the Referee as statements previously made and 
duly filed in the case. See Ohio f 2020.23. 
The decision of the Court of Common Pleas at Ohio fl 9449 is affirmed 
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determination shall be made by the division within ninety [90] days after 
the filing of such an application. Until a seasonal determination by the 
division has been made in accordance with this section, no employer or 
worker may be considered seasonal. 
(c) Any interested party may file an appeal regarding a seasonal 
determination within fifteen [15] calendar days after the determination by 
the division and obtain review of the determination in accordance with IC 
22-4-32. 
(d) Whenever an employer is determined to be a seasonal employer, the 
following provisions apply: 
(1) The seasonal determination becomes effective the first day of the 
calendar quarter commencing after the date of the seasonal determination. 
(2) The seasonal determination does not affect any benefit rights of 
seasonal workers with respect to employment before the effective date of 
the seasonal determination. 
(e) If a seasonal employer, after the date of its seasonal determination, 
operates its business or its seasonal operation during a period or periods of 
twenty-six [26] weeks or more in a calendar year, the employer shall be 
determined by the division to have lost its seasonal status with respect to 
that business or operation effective at the end of the then current calendar 
quarter. The redetermination shall be reported in writing to the employer. 
Any interested party may file an appeal within fifteen [15] calendar days 
after the redetermination by the division and obtain review of the 
redetermination in accordance with IC 22-4-32. 
(f) Seasonal employers shall keep account of wages paid to seasonal 
workers within the seasonal period as determined by the division, and shall 
report these wages on a special seasonal quarterly report form provided by 
the division. 
(g) The division shall adopt rules applicable to seasonal employers for 
determining their normal seasonal period or periods. [IC 22-4-14-11, as 
added by P.L.228-1983, § 4.] 
CHAPTER 15 
DISQUALIFICATION FOR BENEFITS 
SECTION. 
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sources. 
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22-2-15-8. Benefits received from private 
plans excepted. 
22-4-15-1. Grounds for disqualification — Exceptions. — (a) With 
Aspect to benefit periods, including extended benefit periods, established 
on and after July 3, 1977, and before July 6, 1980, an individual who has 
voluntarily left his employment without good cause in connection with the 
work or who was discharged from his employment for just cause is 
ineligible for waiting period or benefit rights for the week in which the 
disqualifying separation occurred and until he has subsequently earned 
remuneration in employment equal to or exceeding eight [8] times the 
SECTION. 
22-4-15-1. Grounds for disqualification — 
Exceptions. 
22-4-15-2. Failure without good cause to 
apply for or accept suit-
able work — Determina-
tion of suitable work. 
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tion. 
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Simon, Anninos & Namanworth Co., L. P. A., Eli Namanworth, 408 Gwynne Bldg., 
602 Main St., Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for plaintiff-appellant. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, 
Lawrence C. Mackowiak, First National Bank Center, Fountain Square, Cincinnati, Ohio 
45202, for defendant-appellee, Earle M. Jorgensen Co. 
PER CURIAM: This cause came on to be 
heard upon the appeal, the transcript of 
the docket, journal entries and original 
papers, including the transcript of the ad-
ministrative proceedings, from the Court of 
Common Pleas, Hamilton County, Ohio, the 
briefs and the arguments of counsel. 
Appellant seeks unemployment compen-
sation after termination from his job as a 
"burner" (cutter of steel plates) at Earle 
M. Jorgensen Company (employer). His 
claim was denied at all administrative levels, 
and these decisions were affirmed by the 
court of common pleas. In two assignments 
of error, appellant asserts that he was 
denied a fair hearing before the administra-
tive referee and that the administrative 
denial of benefits was unlawful, unreason-
able and against the manifest weight of 
the evidence. We are not persuaded. 
The employer is a metal service center 
that purchases steel from suppliers and 
processes it to the exact specifications of 
its customers. Appellant worked as a 
"burner" for two years and three months, 
and he was discharged for carelessness. At 
the referee's hearing under R. C. 4141.28(J) 
no attorneys were present, appellant repre-
senting himself and the assistant general 
manager representing the employer. 
Appellant's first assignment of error as-
serts the hearing was unfair, because he was 
not accorded the opportunity to cross-ex-
amine, he was not advised of the objec-
tionable character of the employer's hearsay 
evidence, and much of this evidence was 
hearsay on hearsay. The statute, however, 
does not require the strict formality of the 
rules of procedure and of evidence applic-
able to judicial hearings. The parties must 
be afforded "reasonable opportunity for a 
fair hearing," under R. C 4141.28(1), which 
goes on to provide: 
In the conduct of such hearing or any 
other hearing on appeal to the board 
which is provided in this section, the 
board and the referees shall not be bound 
by common law or statutory rules of 
evidence or by technical or formal rules 
of procedure. The board and the referees 
shall take any steps in such hearings, 
consistent with the impartial discharge of 
their duties, which appear reasonable and 
necessary to ascertain the facts and de-
termine whether the claimant is entitled 
to benefits under the law. 
We agree with the common pleas court 
that the hearing sub judice met the statutory 
standard of fairness. The conduct of the 
hearing was informal and did not follow 
the rigorous order of a judicial hearing, 
but appellant was afforded every reason-
able opportunity to question the employer's 
assertions of carelessness and damage. 
There was no need to advise appellant that 
the employer's evidence was objectionable 
as hearsay, because the rules of evidence 
do not apply. In addition, much of the 
damaging evidence against appellant was 
either admitted by him or within the per-
sonal knowledge of the employer's repre-
sentative. The claim of prejudice by reason 
of the receipt of double hearsay is without 
foundation, because those facts testified to 
by the employer's representative that were 
beyond his personal knowledge were prop-
erly considered by the referee as being in 
the nature of either business records or 
summaries of voluminous records, or they 
were already properly before the referee as 
statements previously made and duly filed 
in the case. R. C. 4141.28(J). The first as-
signment of error has no merit. 
Appellant's second assignment asserts 
that the common pleas court erred in affirm-
ing the administrative decision because 
that decision was unlawful, unreasonable 
and against the manifest weight of the 
evidence R. G 4141.28(0). Our review 
of the record discloses no breach of law 
at the administrative level. The transcript 
of the administrative procedures discloses 
that during the period of employment, ap-
pellant was responsible for more than forty 
instances of careless work and had thirteen 
personal counseling interviews with his su-
periors directed at improving the erratic • 
quality of his work. The decision that1 
appellant was discharged for just cause is-
both reasonable and supported by the evi-
dence presented to the referee. A reviewing 
court cannot impose a higher standard of 
proof than what the statute requires in tn"e 
administrative proceedings. Simon v. Lake 
Geauga Printing Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St. 
2d 41, 430 N. E. 2d 468. The second assign-
ment is meritless. 
We affirm. 
KEEFE, P, ] , 111 M"K and FNIAII II 
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Claimant for unemployment compensation Lnemployment Comp. Comm'n, Del. Super., 86 
benefits must do more than be passively A.2d 856 (1952). 
available and waiting for work Lore v. 
§ 3315. Disqualification for benefits. 
An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: 
"" (1) For the period of unemployment next ensuing after he has left his 
work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work. However, 
if an individual has left his work involuntarily because of illness, no 
disqualification shall prevail after he becomes able to work and available for 
work and meets all other requirements under this title, but the Department 
shall require a doctor's certificate to establish such availability. Wage 
credits earned in such work, if employment under this title, shall not 
constitute benefit wages in connection with §§ 3349-3356 of this title. 
(2) For the period of unemployment next ensuing after an individual has 
been discharged from his work for just cause in connection with his work. 
Wage credits earned in such work, if employment under this title, shall not 
constitute benefit wages in connection with §§ 3349-3356 of this title. 
(3) If he has refused to accept an offer of work for which he is reasonably 
fitted or has refused to accept a referral to a job opportunity when directed 
to do so by a local employment office of this State or another state, and the 
disqualification shall begin with the week in which the refusal occurred and 
shall continue for the duration of the period of unemployment during which 
such refusal occurred; provided that no individual shall be disqualified under 
this subdivision for refusing to accept an offer of work or a referral while 
he is attending a vocational training course approved by the Department if 
the acceptance~of such offer or referral would prevent him from completing 
the course. No individual otherwise qualified to receive benefits shall lose 
the right to benefits by reason of a refusal to accept a referral or new work 
if: 
a. As a condition of being so employed, he would be required by the 
employer to join a company union or would be required by the employer 
to resign from or refrain from joining any bona fide labor organization 
or would be denied the right by the employer to retain membership in 
and observe the lawful rules of any such organization; or 
b. The position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout or 
other labor dispute; or 
c. The work is at an unreasonable distance from his residence, having 
regard to the character of the work he has been accustomed to do, and 
travel to the place of work involves expenses substantially greater than 
that required for his former work; or 
d. The remuneration, hours or other conditions of the work offered 
are substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing 
for similar work in the locality; 
(4) For any week with respect to which the Department finds that his 
total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists 
because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment or other premises 
at which he is or was last employed; 
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weekly benefit amount of Ms claim. If the qualification amount has not 
been earned at the expiration of an individual's benefit period, the 
unearned amount shall he carried forward to an extended benefit period or 
to the benefit period of a subsequent claim, 
Ob) With respect to bepefit periodst established on and after July 6,1980, 
an individual who has voluntarily l^ ft his employment without good cause 
in connection with the work or y^ho was discharged from his employment 
for just cause is ineligible for waiting period or benefit rights for the week 
in which the disqualifying separation occurred and until he has earned 
remuneration in employment equal to or exceeding the weekly benefit 
amount of his claim m each of eight [81 weeks. If thq qualification amount 
has not been earned at the expiration of an individual s benefit period, the 
unearned amount shall be earned for ward to* an extended benefit period or 
to the benefit period of a subsequentidaim. 
(c) When it has been determined that an individual has been separated 
from employment under disqualifying conditions as outlined in this section, 
the maximum benefit amount irfhia current claim, as initially determined, 
shall be reduced by twenty-five percent [25%]. If twenty-five percent [25%] 
of the maximum benefit amount is not an even dollar amount, the amount 
of such reduction will be Raised to the next higher even dollar amount. 
When twenty-five pehsent;T2S%r1tf the maximum benefit amount, as 
initially determined, exceeds the unpaid balance remaining in the claim, 
such reduction will be limited**the \mpaid balance. 
(d) The dis<|uaUficationspiwndedl»tWs section shall be subject to the 
following modifications: 
(1) An individual shall not be sutyect to disqualification because of 
separation from his prior employment if he left to accept with another 
employer previously secured permanent full-time work which offered 
reasonable expectation of betterment of wages or working conditions and 
thereafter was employed oh said iob for not less than ten [10] weeks or if, 
having been simultaneously employed by two [2] employers, he leaves one 
[1] such employer volimtaariiy^ttiout good cause in connection with the 
work but remains in employment with the second employer for at least ten 
[10] weeks subsequent to leaving the first employer, or if he left to accept 
recall made by a base-period employer. 
(2) An individual whose unemployment is the result of medically 
substantiated physical disability and who is involuntarily unemployed 
after having made reasonable efforts to maintain the employment relation-
ship shall not be subject to disqualification under this section for such 
separation. 
(3) An individual who left work to enter the Armed Forces of the United 
States shall not be subject to disqualification under this section for such 
leaving of work. (4) An individual whose employment is terminated under the compul-
sory retirement prevision of a collective bargaining agreement to which the 
employer is a party, or under any other plan, system, or program, public or 
private, provioing for compulsory retirement and who is otherwise eligible 
shall not be deemed to have left his work voluntarily without good cause in 
connection with the work; however, if such individual subsequently 
becomes reemployed and thereafter yqd^ntarily leaves work without good 
cause in connection with the work, he shall he deemed ineligible as 
outlined in this section. (5) An otherwise eligible individual shall not be denied benefits for any 
week because he is in training approved under Section 236(a)(1) [19 U.S.C. 
§ 2296(a)(1)] of the Tfade Aw of 1974, ttor dhall the individual be denied 
benefits by reason of leaving work to enter such training, provided the 
work left is not suitable employment, offcecause of the application to any 
week in training of provkmi* m this* law (or any applicable federal 
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unemployment compensation law), relating to availability for work, active 
search for work, or refusal to accept work. For purposes of this subdivision, 
the term "suitable employment" moans with respect to an individual, work 
of a substantially equal cor higher skill level than the individual's past 
adversely affected employment (ias defined for purposes of the Trade Act of 
1974), and. wages for such work at not less than eighty percent [80%] of the 
individual's average* weekly wage as determined for the purposes of the 
Trade Act of 1974T ;' 
(e) "Discharge for just cauae" as used in this section is defined to include 
but not be limited to; ^ ; ^ 
(1) Separation initiated by an employer for falsification of an employ-
ment application ta obtain employment through subterfuge; 
(2) l o w i n g violation of It reasonable and uniformly enforced rule of an 
employer; 
(3) Unsatisfactwy attendance, if the individual cannot show good cause 
for absences or tardiness; 
(4) Damaging the? employwr'a property through wilful negligence; 
(5) RefusinytoobeyiiurtTUctions; 
(6) Reporting to work under the influence of alcohol or drugs or 
consuming alcohol or drugs on employer's premises during working hours; 
(7) Conduct endangering safety of self or coworkers; or 
(8) Incarceration in jail following conviction of a misdemeanor or felony 
by a court of competent jurisdiction or for any breach of duty in connection 
with work which is reasonably owed an employer by an employee. [Acts 
1947, eh. 208, § -Uktti'B. W8; 1957, ch. 261, § 1; 1965, ch. 190, § 9; 1967, 
ch. 310, § 19; m i , B I * 36&i 35; 1972, P.L. 174, § 1; 1974, P.L. 110, § 4; 
1977, Pi* 262, r ^ l « a 0 i PX. 158, § 5; 1982, P.L. 95, § 4*1 
Cited: Bendix Corp. v. Radecki (1973), 158 
Ind. App. 370,39 Ind. Dec. 376,302 N. E. (2d) 
847; Walker v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp. 
Security Div., — Ind. App. —, 76 Ind. Dec. 
356, 404 N.E.24 1363 (1980); Russell v. 
Review Bd. of Ind. Emp. Security Div., — Ind. 
App. ~ , 415 N.E.2d 774 (1981); Forster v. 
Review Bd. of Ind. Emp. Security Div., — Ind. 
App. —, 420 N.E.2d 1287 (1981); Pierce 
Governor Co. v. Review Bd., — Ind. App. —, 
426 N.E.2d 700 (1981); Flick v. Review Bd., 
— Ind. App.—, 443 N.E.2d 84 (1982). 
Adnic Cod** M* pertinent ad-
ministrative rales ana refulafions, see the 
Statutory Tables in toe tables volume of the 
Indiana Administrative Code. 
Indiana Law Review. Survey of Recent 
Developments in Indiana Law, XL Labor 
Law (Gregory J. UtktraX 11 Ind. L Rev. 196. 
Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana 
Law, XL Labor Law (Richard J. Darko), 13 
Ind. L. Rev. 295. 
Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana 
Law, V. Constitutional Law (Stephen E. 
Arthur and Christopher DrSeigel), 14 Ind. L. 
Bap* 196. 
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r INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UT/ 
wtPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURIT 
Appeals Section 
Dec 1s I :: i i :: f Administrative Law Judge 
Abdul H. Dailami : 
933 North 200 West 
Logan, Utah 84321 : Case No. 85-A-1283 
APPEAL FILED: February 25, 1985 DATE OF HEARING: March 20, 1985 
APPEARANCES: Claimant and Employer PLAt 
The Departments decision dated February 20, 1985, denied unemployment insurance 
benefits effective January 27, 1985, on the grounds the claimant was discharged 
for just cause. Section 35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act is 
quoted on the attached sheet. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Prior to f i l ing a claim for unemployment insurance benefits effective January 27, 
1985, the claimant earned $10.35 per hour working as a boiler operator for Logan 
Regional Hospital from September 10, 1980, to January 31, 1985. His weekly bene-
" t amount is $186 for twenty-six weeks. 
The claimant was discharged for failing _ jperate hospital equipment according 
to polic) He discovered a leaky water pressure valve and he determined the 
valve had to be repaired immediately. The system had a by-pass valve to permit 
the water to continue to flow, but the valve required manual regulation of the 
pressure. The claimant activated the valve, and he asked one of his co-workers 
to assist him in watching the pressure valve. When the by-pass valve was turned 
on, the water pressure was too great and i t caused minor flooding on the upper 
floors of the building. The claimant reduced the pressure and, at a point, the 
pressure was too low causing employees to complain about no water. The claimant 
thought he had the valve adjusted correctly and he repaired the faulty part. 
Ihe claimant's supervisor later learned that there had been a shut-down of the 
water system and he terminated the claimant. The claimant was aware of the 
proper procedures to operate the water system and he believed he had performed 
the task correctly. He stated the water never stopped flowing through the system. 
There had been three prior occasions when the claimant had been involved in 
equipment shutdowns. He had received two disciplinary counseling actions and a 
reprimand for the incidents. 
REASONING AND CONCLUSION C I I - ' ' 
1he disqualification providec Section 5(b)(1) does not apply where evidence 
shows the discharge was due ^ ^ c i e n c y , unsatisfactory conduct, failure in 
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good performance as the result of Inability or Incapability, inadvertencies or 
ordinary negligence in Isolated instaj^AS^ or good faith errors in judgement. 
A denial of unemployment Insurance benefits following a discharge is based on a 
fault concept, as explained in the following decision: 
When an employee 1s discharged by his employer, such dis-
charge may have been the result of incompetence, lack of 
s k i l l , or other reasons which are clearly beyond the 
claimant's control. The fact of willful or wanton conduct 
is not established merely by the claimant's knowledge that 
he is violating a reasonable rule of the employer; rather, 
i t must be shown from the evidence that the claimant knew 
or had reason to know that his conduct may result in loss 
of employment. (Utah Board of Review, 80-BR-322.) 
In the present case, the claimant testified credibly he believed he had handled 
the procedures to switch the water to the by-pass system in order to repair the 
pressure valve correctly. I t was unclear how long any unit of the hospital may 
have been without water or had the water supply curtailed, but the evidence 
established the claimant had made a valid effort to keep the system operating 
effectively. Even though he may have been previously involved in incidents detr i -
mental to the hospital's equipment, the testimony did not establish culpable 
negligence or a disregard for the employer's interest in his actions. I t is held 
the circumstances were the result of inadvertent conditions beyond the claimant's 
power to control and i t is concluded he was not discharged for just cause in 
accordance with the Utah Employment Security Act. 
DECISION: 
The decision of the Department representative is reversed and benefits are allowed 
effective January 27, 1985, pursuant to Section 35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah Employ-
ment Security Act provided the claimant is otherwise eligible. 
This decision will become final unless within ten days from March 26, 1985, 
further written appeal is made to the Board of Review (P. 0. Box 11600, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84147) setting forth the grounds upon which the appeal is made. 
jsn 
Attachment 
cc: Logan Regional Hospital 
1400 North 500 East 
Logan, Utah 84321 
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BOARD OF REVIEW 
The Industrial Commission of Utah 
Unemployment Compensation Appeals 
ABDUL H. DAILAMI : 
S.S.A. No. 529 29 0539 
: Case No. 85-A-1283 
vs. : DECISION 
: Case No. 85-BR-210 
*RTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY : 
After careful consideration of the record and testimony the 
above-entitled matter, the Board of Review finds the decision of the Admin-
istrative Law Judge to be fair and unbiased and supported by competent 
evidence and, therefore, affirms such decision allowing benefits to the 
claimant effective January 27, 1985, and continuing, provided he is other-
wise eligible, on the grounds he was discharged from his employment for 
conduct which is not disqualifying under the provisions of §35-4-5(b)(l) of 
the Utah Employment Security Act. In so holding, the Board of Review hereby 
adopts the findings of fact and conclusion of law of the decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge. 
In affirming the decision _* the Administrative Law Judge, the 
Board of Review notes the employer's argument that the Administrative Law 
Judge applied an erroneous standard to the case. Specifically, it is the 
employer s contention that the quotation by the Administrative Law Judge of 
a 1980 decision evidences an application of the willful or wanton conduct 
standard, whereas the Legislature 1n 1983 added a "just cause" standard. 
However, a review of the decision of the Administrative Law Judge shows that 
his purpose in quoting a portion of a 1980 Board of Review decision was simply 
to explain that there must be a showing from the evidence that the claimant 
knew or had reason to know his conduct might result 1n loss of employment. 
This standard relates to the fault concept applicable to disqualifications 
from receipt of unemployment benefits. The Utah Supreme Court has very 
recently stated that "[N]ot every cause for discharge provides a basis 
to deny eligibility for unemployment compensation." Board of Education of 
Sevier County School District v. Board of Review, 11 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 17 
11983), Case No. 19/bO, quoting Clearfield city v. Department of Employment 
Security, Utah, 663 P.2d 440, 441 (1983). 
In the case of Kehl v. Board of Review, 10 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (1985), 
Case No. 20193, cited by the employer 1n its brief to the Board, the Utah 
Supreme Court reviewed the case law of Delaware, Ohio, and Indiana in its 
consideration of the meaning of the term "just cause." The court then 
reviewed the Department's proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(II)-l in light of the 
meaning given "just cause" in other jurisdictions and concluded that the 
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proposed Rules and Regulations are within the limits of reasonableness and 
rationality. I t should be noted that the proposed rule 1s not binding at 
this point 1n time, as 1t has not become final. However, 1t provides guidance 
1n an area that Is new to this jurisdiction, that 1s, the meaning of the term 
"just cause." 
The proposed rule provides that the basic factors for establishing 
fault are culpability, knowledge, and control. In reviewing the negligence 
complained of by the employer In the instant case against those factors, the 
Board of Review finds that the claimant's failure to control the water pres-
sure in the building with a bypass valve while trying to repair the regular 
valve was beyond the claimant s control. I t was this Incident which led to 
the claimant's discharge. All of the prior incidences of which the employer 
complains occurred in 1983, with the exception of one which occurred in Sep-
tember of 1984. While the Incidences which occurred in 1983 may been within 
the claimant's control, the employer chose not to discharge the claimant at 
that time. The employer also complains that the claimant failed to repair a 
malfunctioning water heater for a period of two years. The question must be 
asked why the employer allowed the claimant to take two years to effect the 
necessary repairs to the water heater. 
Although the employer has provided evidence of Incidences where the 
claimant failed to properly perform his duties, the record is devoid of any 
evidence to show that the claimant acted with culpability. The term culpa-
bility has previously been defined by the Supreme Court as referring to how 
serious the claimant's conduct affects his job or the employer's rightful 
interests. See Clearfield City v. Board of Review, supra. 
Based on the evidence of record in this case, the Board of Review 
concludes that the employer has failed to show that the claimant's performance 
was the result of anything other than inability, incapacity or isolated 
instances of inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in Isolated instances. 
Under such circumstances, the allowance of benefits must be affirmed. 
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This decision will become final ten days after the date of mailing 
hereof, and any further appeal must be made directly with the Utah Supreme 
Court at the State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, within ten days 
after this decision becomes final. To file an appeal with the Supreme Court, 
you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for Writ of Review 
setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35-4-10(1) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief. 
3QAR0 OF REVIEW 
Dated this 18th day of June, 1985. 
Date Mailed: June 21, 1985. 
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